It's Getting Hot in Here: Hardware Security Implications of Thermal Crosstalk on ReRAMs

Emerging non-volatile memories (eNVM) promise to solve the imminent von Neumann bottleneck by enabling future computing systems to utilize the computing-in-memory (CIM) paradigm offering exceptional energy efficiency and performance advantages. As Moore's law becomes obsolete, CIM architectures are prominent candidates to push the boundaries of existing computing systems and usher in a new generation of computing models, such as neuromorphic systems. Furthermore, conventional systems face another significant problem in addition to the von Neumann bottleneck. Hardware security threats (e.g., Rowhammer) have gained momentum and can expose an entirely pristine attack surface for adversaries. These vulnerabilities distinguish themselves by being particularly challenging to patch because their origin lies in the rigid hardware layout. Unfortunately, neuromorphic systems are no exception. We presented NeuroHammer as one of the first unique hardware security attacks on eNVMs, enabling an attacker to intentionally flip bits in memristive crossbar arrays. This article extends our previous results by thoroughly examining the underlying concepts leading to the NeuroHammer attack. First, we investigate memory access patterns to gain insight into the tangible impact of NeuroHammer. Second, we extend our simulation methodology to accommodate transistor/one resistive (1T1R) crossbar structures and prove the prevalence of the NeuroHammer attack. Finally, we discuss the real-world implications of NeuroHammer on CIM architectures.