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  4. Adding Channel Binding for an Out-of-Band OTP Authentication Protocol in an Industrial Use-Case
 
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2018
Conference Paper
Title

Adding Channel Binding for an Out-of-Band OTP Authentication Protocol in an Industrial Use-Case

Abstract
One Time Passwords (OTPs) are used to increase the security of the authentication process of networked applications. Smartphone based OTP schemes already brought usable and affordable multi-factor authentication to web applications. These schemes are also a promising approach for authentication in industrial applications. This paper introduces an industrial remote maintenance use-case that uses a smartphone based OTP authentication scheme using Quick-Response (QR) codes. In addition to a main communication and password authentication channel, the proposed scheme requires an out-of-band communication channel to transmit OTPs via smartphone. While baseline security for the channels can be achieved with Transport Layer Security (TLS), Out-of-Band Authentication (OOBA) remains vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks in environments where the authenticity of a communicating party cannot be guaranteed. In order to mitigate this problem, it is crucial to establish a secure channel association. The enhancement proposed in this paper thus cryptographically binds successful out-of-band OTP authentications to the previously established data-channel with the help of TLS channel binding. Recommendations include common TLS libraries that support this feature as well as further considerations for a secure implementation.
Author(s)
Plaga, S.
Niethammer, M.
Wiedermann, N.
Borisov, A.
Mainwork
1st International Conference on Data Intelligence and Security, ICDIS 2018  
Conference
International Conference on Data Intelligence and Security (ICDIS) 2018  
DOI
10.1109/ICDIS.2018.00048
Language
English
Fraunhofer-Institut für Angewandte und Integrierte Sicherheit AISEC  
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