Dynamics in the german system of corporate governance? Recent empirical findings regarding interlocking directorates

It has recently been argued that the insider system of German corporate governance is moving towards the Anglo-Saxon outsider system. This argument rests on the observation of a declining number of interlocking directorates that have traditionally tied together large German corporations. First, we show that the structural analysis of the German network of interlocking directorates reveals a high degree of continuity on the meso- and macro-level between 1989 and 2001. Quantitative dilution has not been translated into a process of structural erosion. Second, the German market for corporate control is underdeveloped as three quarters of public teke-over bids are tendered to cnsolidate already existing controlling stockholdings, and there is no critical mass of companies for trade in this market. Consequently, 'network governance' still seems a proper description of how German corporate governance is organized today.