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2014
Conference Paper
Titel

Side-channel analysis of a high-throughput AES peripheral with countermeasures

Abstract
We analyze the side-channel countermeasures implemented in a high-throughput AES peripheral of a commercially available microcontroller which is not dedicated to high security applications. We detect and classify the employed countermeasures and examine their effectiveness against first-order DPA attacks. We practically demonstrate, that all of the implemented countermeasures, which are common time-based hiding countermeasures, can easily be nullified with simple preprocessing methods. This is caused by the inherent properties of high-throughput designs (low number of cycles), which offers few choices for such countermeasures. Hence, we found that the effectively achieved side-channel protection is significantly lower than the theoretically expected one due to the way countermeasures are implemented and present ways to improve the effectiveness. We also reveal a design flaw in the implementation which allows timing-based attacks on the device.
Author(s)
Heinz, B.
Heyszl, J.
Stumpf, F.
Hauptwerk
14th International Symposium on Integrated Circuits, ISIC 2014. Proceedings
Konferenz
International Symposium on Integrated Circuits (ISIC) 2014
Thumbnail Image
DOI
10.1109/ISICIR.2014.7029540
Language
English
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Fraunhofer-Institut für Angewandte und Integrierte Sicherheit AISEC
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