Hiding privacy leaks in android applications using low-attention raising covert channels

Covert channels enable a policy-breaking communication not foreseen by a system's design. Recently, covert channels in Android were presented and it was shown that these channels can be used by malware to leak confidential information (e.g., contacts) between applications and to the Internet. Performance aspects as well as means to counter these covert channels were evaluated. In this paper, we present novel covert channel techniques linked to a minimized footprint to achieve a high covertness. Therefore, we developed a malware that slowly leaks collected private information and sends it synchronously based on four covert channel techniques. We show that some of our covert channels do not require any extra permission and escape well know detection techniques like TaintDroid. Experimental results confirm that the obtained throughput is correlated to the user interaction and show that these new covert channels have a low energy consumption - both aspects contribute to the stealthiness of the channels. Finally, we discuss concepts for novel means capable to counter our covert channels and we also discuss the adaption of network covert channel features to Android-based covert channels.