Wani, Mohamad SaalimMohamad SaalimWaniRademacher, MichaelMichaelRademacherHorstmann, ThorstenThorstenHorstmannKretschmer, MathiasMathiasKretschmer2024-04-042024-04-042024https://publica.fraunhofer.de/handle/publica/46568010.3390/jcp40100025G networks, pivotal for our digital mobile societies, are transitioning from 4G to 5G Stand-Alone (SA) networks. However, during this transition, 5G Non-Stand-Alone (NSA) networks are widely used. This paper examines potential security vulnerabilities in 5G NSA networks. Through an extensive literature review, we identify known 4G attacks that can theoretically be applied to 5G NSA. We organize these attacks into a structured taxonomy. Our findings reveal that 5G NSA networks may offer a false sense of security, as most security and privacy improvements are concentrated in 5G SA networks. To underscore this concern, we implement three attacks with severe consequences and successfully validate them on various commercially available smartphones. Notably, one of these attacks, the IMSI Leak, consistently exposes user information with no apparent security mitigation in 5G NSA networks. This highlights the ease of tracking individuals on current 5G networks.enjournal article