Selmke, BodoBodoSelmkeStrieder, EmanueleEmanueleStriederHeyszl, JohannJohannHeyszlFreud, S.S.FreudDamm, T.T.Damm2022-10-052022-10-052022https://publica.fraunhofer.de/handle/publica/42728910.1007/978-3-031-08147-7_62-s2.0-85132978216Laser fault injection attacks on hardware implementations are challenging, due to the inherently large parameter space of the fault injection and the unknown underlying implementation of the attacked device. In this work we report details from an exemplary laser fault attack on the AES-based authentication chip Microchip ATAES 132A, which lead to full secret key extraction. In addition we were able to reveal some details of the underlying implementation. This chip claims to feature various countermeasures and tamper detection mechanisms and is therefore a representative candidate for devices to be found in many different applications. On this basis we describe a systematic approach for Laser fault attacks on devices in a black-box scenario. This includes the determination of all relevant attack parameters such as fault locations, timings, and energy settings.enFault attackFault injectionLaser fault injectionPhysical device securitySecurityconference paper