Pirnay, NiklasNiklasPirnayPappa, AnnaAnnaPappaSeifert, Jean-PierreJean-PierreSeifert2022-07-142022-07-142022https://publica.fraunhofer.de/handle/publica/41886210.1007/s42484-022-00073-1Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) have been proposed as a way to identify and authenticate electronic devices. Recently, several ideas have been presented to that aim to achieve the same for quantum devices. Some of these constructions apply single-qubit gates in order to provide a secure fingerprint of the quantum device. In this work, we formalize the class of classical readout quantum PUFs (CR-QPUFs) using the statistical query (SQ) model and explicitly show insufficient security for CR-QPUFs based on single-qubit rotation gates, when the adversary has SQ access to the CR-QPUF. We demonstrate how a malicious party can learn the CR-QPUF characteristics and forge the signature of a quantum device through a modelling attack using a simple regression of low-degree polynomials. The proposed modelling attack was successfully implemented in a real-world scenario on real IBM Q quantum machines. We thoroughly discuss the prospects and problems of CR-QPUFs where quantum device imperfections are used as a secure fingerprint.enquantum physical unclonable functionmodelling attackcomputer securitymachine learningDDC::000 Informatik, Informationswissenschaft, allgemeine Werke::000 Informatik, Wissen, Systeme::004 Datenverarbeitung; InformatikDDC::600 Technik, Medizin, angewandte Wissenschaften::620 Ingenieurwissenschaften::621 Angewandte Physikjournal article