Duscha, VickiVickiDuschaEhrhart, Karl-MartinKarl-MartinEhrhart2022-03-052022-03-052016https://publica.fraunhofer.de/handle/publica/24354510.1007/s10640-016-0015-5We analyze the potential of no-lose targets used as an instrument to integrate non-Annex I countries in global emission reduction efforts. We set up a game-theoretical model to derive the participation conditions for a non-Annex I country and evaluate the effect of a no-lose target on the reduction of global emissions. Our analyses show that meaningful contributions from non-Annex I countries are possible, but their contribution to global emission reductions is limited and depends on several factors. Ambitious targets for the Annex I countries are a precondition. Further determining factors are differences in the abatement potentials between Annex I and non-Annex I countries, and market power on the certificate market. Nonetheless, in contrast to other funding mechanisms, no-lose targets, rather than requiring additional funding, can actually reduce costs for the Annex I countries.enemissions tradingno-lose targetsprofitabilityNon-Annex I countriesPost-Kyoto303600journal article