Fanghella, ValeriaValeriaFanghellaFaure, CorinneCorinneFaureGuetlein, Marie-CharlotteMarie-CharlotteGuetleinSchleich, JoachimJoachimSchleich2022-11-092022-11-092023https://publica.fraunhofer.de/handle/publica/42850310.1016/j.ecolecon.2022.107659Public acceptability appears an essential condition for the success of low-carbon transition policies. In this paper, we investigate the role of self-interest on citizens’ preferences for the distribution of costs and environmental benefits of energy efficiency policies. Using a discrete choice experiment on nationally representative household samples of Sweden, Italy, and the United Kingdom, we first investigate preferences for national burden-sharing rules and for the distribution of environmental benefits accruing primarily in rural and/or urban areas. We examine the role of self-interest and self-serving bias in a correlational manner by looking at the effects of income and location of residency on preferences for these policy attributes. Moreover, we investigate the effect of self serving bias on preferences for burden-sharing rules in a causal manner by experimentally priming randomly assigned groups of participants to feel either rich or poor. Our results suggest that the accountability rule is the most popular and the equal-amount rule the least popular burden-sharing rule. Further, policies with environ mental benefits accruing primarily in rural areas are least preferred. We find some evidence for self-interest, especially through our correlational approach. Finally, across country samples, our results reveal heterogene ity in preferences for policy attributes and in the prevalence of self-interest.enPolicy acceptabilitySelf-interestSelf-serving biasDistributional fairnessBurden-sharing rulesDiscrete choice experimentEnergy efficiencyjournal article