Definition and test of the electromagnetic immunity of UAS for first responders

Recent technological developments considerably lowered the barrier for unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to be employed in a variety of usage scenarios, comprising live video transmission from otherwise inaccessible vantage points. As an example, in the French-German ANCHORS project several UAS guided by swarm intelligence provide aerial views and environmental data of a disaster site while deploying an ad-hoc communication network for first responders. Since being able to operate in harsh environmental conditions is a key feature, the immunity of the UAS against radio frequency (RF) exposure has been studied. Conventional Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) applied to commercial and industrial electronics is not sufficient since UAS are airborne and can as such move beyond the bounds within which RF exposure is usually limited by regulatory measures. Therefore, the EMC requirements have been complemented by a set of specific RF test frequencies and parameters where strong sources are expected to interfere in the example project test case of an inland port environment. While no essential malfunctions could be observed up to field strengths of 30 V m−1, a sophisticated, more exhaustive approach for testing against potential sources of interference in key scenarios of UAS usage should be derived from our present findings.Recent technological developments considerably lowered the barrier for unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to be employed in a variety of usage scenarios, comprising live video transmission from otherwise inaccessible vantage points. As an example, in the French-German ANCHORS project several UAS guided by swarm intelligence provide aerial views and environmental data of a disaster site while deploying an ad-hoc communication network for first responders. Since being able to operate in harsh environmental conditions is a key feature, the immunity of the UAS against radio frequency (RF) exposure has been studied. Conventional Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) applied to commercial and industrial electronics is not sufficient since UAS are airborne and can as such move beyond the bounds within which RF exposure is usually limited by regulatory measures. Therefore, the EMC requirements have been complemented by a set of specific RF test frequencies and parameters where strong sources are expected to interfere in the example project test case of an inland port environment. While no essential malfunctions could be observed up to field strengths of 30 V m−1, a sophisticated, more exhaustive approach for testing against potential sources of interference in key scenarios of UAS usage should be derived from our present findings.