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# Evaluation of measurement devices for radioactive and nuclear material

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# Introduction

- Fraunhofer INT has **long lasting experience** in the assessment of devices
- **Several devices of different device classes available on the market**
  - PRD: Personal Radiation Detector (also spectroscopic SPRD)
  - RIID: Radiation Isotope Identifiers Device
  - RPM: Radiation Portal Monitor (also spectroscopic SRPM)
- **Evaluation of measurement devices**
  - comparability is difficult
  - no well established standard or quality label
  - test environments for qualification measurements are necessary
- Development of **INT testing facility** to verify instrument's compliance regarding test methods / standards

# Experience

Conference paper INMM annual meeting


- 2006: Detection and Identification of Radioactive Sources Covert Under Water
- 2007: Identification of Nuclear Material with Different Gamma Spectroscopic Devices
- 2009: Searching and identifying radioactive material with hand-held high-resolution Gamma detectors
- 2010: Identification of nuclear material with hand-held and portable gamma and neutron measuring devices
- 2012: Identification Measurements of nuclear material – Detective EX versus Falcon 500
- 2013: The influence of shielding - measurements of nuclear material







Nuclear Security Policy and Detection Techniques

# Identification of nuclear material with hand-held and portable gamma and neutron measuring devices


- measurements at the European joint research centre JRC in ISPRA
- gamma and neutron measurements
- 5 detectors with different detector materials
- nuclear material:  
9 uranium and plutonium sources
- automatic identification
- handling of the detection systems



# Gamma detection systems

	Micro Detective ORTEC 	Inspector 1000 Canberra 	INTERCEPTOR Thermo 	IdentiFINDER Ultra 
crystal material	HPGe	LaBr <sub>3</sub>	CZT	Nal(Tl)
crystal size [cm]	length 3 ø 5	length 3.8 ø 3.8	0.7 x 0.7 x 0.35	length 5.1 ø 3.6
weight [kg]	6.9	2.4 (complete)	0.27	1.25
size of device [cm]	37.4 x 14.6 x 27.9	19 x 16.5 x 6.4 (body)	11.2 x 6.1 x 2.5	24.8 x 9.4 x 7.6
battery life [h]	>3	9	10	8
energy resolution [keV] at 662 keV	1.5	23.2	19	45
relative efficiency	10.7 %	12.6 %	0.02 %	8.0 %

# Gamma Energy Spectra – $^{133}\text{Ba}$ , $^{137}\text{Cs}$ and $^{60}\text{Co}$ sources



# Results

- Uranium:
  - identified by all gamma measurement devices with good quality
  - but partly additional isotopes are identified
    - ➡ altogether 7 of 19 measurements ✓
- Plutonium:
  - identification is more difficult
  - one device could not identify plutonium at all
    - ➡ altogether 7 of 20 measurements ✓
- Different manufactures use different display depiction of the results
- Some manufacturers use unusual definitions for high enriched uranium
- Other measurements: one device always identified Plutonium without presence
  - ➡ necessary to familiarize oneself with the device being used, experience for assessment of the result needed



# Searching and Identifying radioactive material with hand-held gamma detectors

- 6 investigated detection systems
- Search parcours for performance testing in a lab
- $^{60}\text{Co}$  source was hidden
  - 4 different heights
  - 7 persons searching, partly not knowing the devices in advance
  - 24 runs for each person
- Search strategy chosen by the seeker
- Time until finding measured





# Results of all Measurements

- The “best device” does not exist
- Assessment of the devices are often a matter of taste and the experience of the user, e.g. acoustic signals
- Localization: 3 Detectors have shown to be significantly superior to the others  
( $\mu$ -Detective, IdentiFinder, InSpector 1000),  
mean search times about half or less than the others'
- Resulting strategy for tasks without preliminary knowledge of suspicious area:
  1. first: medium-weight detector with reliable identification mode
  2. second: depending on information needed, high resolution detector

# Experts in the ITRAP+10 Program

## ITRAP: Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program

- **Aim:** Evaluation and comparison of the performance of available radiation detection equipment relevant to nuclear security.
- JRC **developed** in cooperation with IAEA and DNDO **test procedures** for testing of Border Monitoring Equipment.
- Working group Researcher participated as **European nuclear security experts**.
- **Task** of the expert: **validation of the test methods** which are based on the ANSI and / or IEC standards.
- Test methods exist for different device classes.
- **Phase II (work package 2) of the ITRAP + 10 Program:** laboratories in Europe are enabled to perform the corresponding tests.

 INT Measurement system is developed


# Evaluation categories

- False identification rate
- Time to alarm; Photons
- Time to alarm; Neutrons
- Accuracy tests for photons
- Over range characteristics for ambient dose equivalent rate indication
- Gamma response of neutron detector and neutron response in the presence of gammas
- Single radionuclide identification - RIID
- Overload characteristics for identification – RIID
- Dynamic sensitivity to gamma and neutron radiations


**static  
measurements**

**dynamic  
measurements**


# INT Static Measurement System – Scheme Top View



# Scheme of INT Static Measurement System – Side View



# INT Static Measurement System





# Video System


detector  
display view  
and timer



source view

# INT dynamic measurement system


- Designed and constructed at the INT
- Trolley carries a source
  - variable height
  - source holder of static system
- Automated drive, velocity and acceleration can be chosen (0.02 m/s – 2.2 m/s as requested)
- Video observation system
- Rail to guide the trolley
- Mobile, can be transported on a trailer



rail sections on base plates

# INT dynamic measurement system

Application situation: Radiation Portal Monitor RPM



Nuclear Security Policy and Detection Techniques

# Summary

- Fraunhofer INT has developed a static and dynamic test environment
- Qualification measurements in the framework of a project have already been done successfully
- New measurement devices for radioactive or nuclear material can be qualified
- Already deployed devices can be qualified, too
- Comparison of different devices is possible and can be the basis for the procurement of additional or new components for replacement, e.g., in the field of military detection equipment
- Both systems are mobile and can be brought where needed

Visit us at **booth A6**  
We have brought our **static measurement system** and a video of the **dynamic system!**