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Cooperation on climate change under economic linkages - How the inclusion of macroeconomic effects affects stability of a global climate coalition

: Kersting, Jan; Duscha, Vicki; Weitzel, Matthias

Volltext urn:nbn:de:0011-n-3789108 (523 KByte PDF)
MD5 Fingerprint: 0d9eec24dafe6bf985dab501cfd46891
Erstellt am: 16.2.2016

Karlsruhe: Fraunhofer ISI, 2015, 48 S.
Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung BMBF
01LA1127A; CORE
Cooperative regimes for future climate policy
Buch, Elektronische Publikation
Fraunhofer ISI ()
game theory; cooperation; climate change; core; stability; macroeconomic effects

Game-theoretic models of international cooperation on climate change come to very different results regarding the stability of the grand coalition of all countries, depending on the stability concept used. In particular, the core-stability concept produces an encouraging result that does not seem to be supported by reality. We extend the game-theoretic model based on this concept by introducing macroeconomic effects of emission reduction measures in multiple countries. The computable general equilibrium model DART and damage functions from the RICE model are used to quantify the theoretical model. Contrary to the classical model, we find that, under a low damage scenario, the core of the resulting co-operative game is empty and no stable global agreement exists. This is mainly due to fossil fuel exporting countries, which are negatively affected by lower fossil fuel prices resulting from emission reduction measures.