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Hier finden Sie wissenschaftliche Publikationen aus den FraunhoferInstituten. Relay selection problem in wireless networks: A solution concept based on stochastic bandits and calibrated forecasters
 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IEEE: IEEE 14th Workshop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless Communications, SPAWC 2013 : Darmstadt, Germany, 16  19 June 2013 Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, 2013 ISBN: 9781467355766 (print) ISBN: 9781467355773 (online) S.385389 
 Workshop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless Communications (SPAWC) <14, 2013, Darmstadt> 

 Englisch 
 Konferenzbeitrag 
 Fraunhofer HHI () 
Abstract
Multiarmed bandit (MAB) problems form a class of sequential optimization problems, in which a player sequentially pulls an arm, selected from a known and finite set of arms, in order to achieve an initially unknown reward. The player aims at maximizing the accumulated reward over the game horizon. In stochastic bandits with side information, it is assumed that some side information is revealed to the player at the beginning of each game trial, and that the instantaneous rewards of each arm are drawn according to a probability distribution attributed to that arm. In this paper, we study the relay selection problem in wireless networks, where users are provided with no channel knowledge. Under the assumption of orthogonal transmission, and from the view point of each user, we show that the selection problem boils down to a stochastic MAB game, with the side information being the predicted joint action profile of other users. We propose a selection strategy to solve this game, which consists of two parallel routines. In the first routine, each player employs a calibrated forecaster to predict the joint action profile of other players, i.e. to obtain the side information. In the second routine, the player balances the explorationexploitation tradeoff, i.e. estimates the reward generating process of arms while trying to attain the maximum achievable accumulated reward. Under reasonable assumptions, the proposed strategy is strongly consistent, in the sense that the accumulated reward of each individual player is not much less than that of the best arm, asymptotically almost surely. Moreover, upon using this strategy, the selection game converges to the set of correlated equilibria.