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Localized electromagnetic analysis of RO PUFs

: Merli, D.; Heyszl, J.; Heinz, B.; Schuster, D.; Stumpf, F.; Sigl, G.


Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers -IEEE-:
IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, HOST 2013. Proceedings : 2-3 June 2013, Austin, Texas
Singapore: Research Publishing Services, 2013
ISBN: 978-1-4799-0559-1 (Print)
ISBN: 978-1-4799-0600-0
International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST) <6, 2013, Austin/Tex.>
Fraunhofer AISEC ()

Among all proposed Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), those based on Ring Oscillators (ROs) are a popular solution for ASICs as well as for FPGAs. However, compared to other PUF architectures, oscillators emit electromagnetic (EM) signals over a relatively long run time, which directly reveal their unique frequencies. Previous work by Merli et al. exploited this fact by global EM measurements and proposed a countermeasure for their attack. In this paper, we first demonstrate that it is feasible to measure and locate the EM emission of a single tiny RO consisting of only three inverters, implemented within a single configurable logic block of a Xilinx Spartan-3A. Second, we present a localized EM attack for standard and protected RO PUFs. We practically investigate the proposed side-channel attack on a protected FPGA RO PUF implementation. We show that RO PUFs are prone to localized EM attacks and propose two countermeasures, namely, randomization of RO measurement lo gic and interleaved placement.