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A taxonomy for attack patterns on information flows in component-based operating systems

: Hanspach, Michael; Keller, Jörg

Preprint urn:nbn:de:0011-n-2651007 (678 KByte PDF)
MD5 Fingerprint: 8d6fe5f00e0e0eead215cb995bcfc98f
Created on: 7.11.2013

Fulltext urn:nbn:de:0011-n-265100-18 (201 KByte PDF)
MD5 Fingerprint: 6a015df6ab954e5de2dbc0a326316cdb
Created on: 29.11.2013

Schuba, C. (Hrsg.) ; Applied Computer Security Associates -ACSA-:
7th Layered Assurance Workshop, LAW 2013. Proceedings : New Orleans, Louisiana, USA, 9–10 December 2013
New Orleans, LA, 2013
Layered Assurance Workshop (LAW) <7, 2013, New Orleans/La.>
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC) <29, 2013, New Orleans/La.>
Conference Paper, Electronic Publication
Fraunhofer FKIE
micro kernel; separation kernel; MILS; covert channels; side channels; multilevel security

We present a taxonomy and an algebra for attack patterns on component-based operating systems.In a multilevel security scenario, where isolation of partitions containing data at different security classifications is the primary security goal and security breaches are mainly defined as undesired disclosure or modification of classified data, strict control of information flows is the ultimate goal.In order to prevent undesired information flows, we provide a classification of information flow types in a component-based operating system and, by this, possible patterns to attack the system.The systematic consideration of informations flows reveals a specific type of operating system covert channel, the covert physical channel, which connects two former isolated partitions by emitting physical signals into the computer's environment and receiving them at another interface.